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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the deputy sheriff possess specific articulable facts that
appellant was involved in criminal activity to justify the
seizure of Mr. Spidle?

Did the deputy sheriff have a reasonable belief that appellant
was armed and presently dangerous to justify the search of
Mr. Spidle?

iv.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-21-3(2)(c) (1983 as amended) and Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment of conviction of a Class A Misdemeanor.

In the case

at hand, final judgment and conviction were rendered by the
Honorable Judge Michael L. Hutchings, Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah.

v.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

v.

:

RANDY S. SPIDLE,

:

Case No. 870145-CA

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Conviction of the
Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(b)(i), Utah Code
Ann. (Supp. 1986)(Addendum A ) .

The appellant was found guilty after

a bench trial during which his motion to suppress certain evidence
was denied.

The Court sentenced him to one year in jail with 185

days of the jail term suspended upon completion of probation.

Judge

Hutchings stayed the imposition of the jail term pending the outcome
of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 12, 1986, at approximately 6:20 P.M., Randy
S. Spidle was arrested in the vicinity of 930 East and Galena Drive,
Sandy, Utah, by two Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs.

The arrest

followed the traffic stop of a vehicle in which Spidle was the
passenger.

The deputies discovered approximately one-quarter pound

of marijuana in Spidle's possession.

On December 12, Rex Kennedy, a Salt Lake County Deputy
Sheriff, was on routine patrol at approximately 9800 South and 750
East (Transcript p. 4 ) . He observed a vehicle, a 1965 Rambler,
which he knew from prior observation to be improperly registered.
Kennedy initiated a traffic stop, pulling the car over at Hoppy and
Galena, approximately 1000 East and 9800 South.

There were two

people in the car, the driver and Spidle, the passenger.
Two or three minutes after the traffic stop, James N.
Richards, a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, arrived to assist
Kennedy (p. 5, 9 ) . Richards conducted field sobriety tests on the
driver at Kennedy's request.

During this time Kennedy checked the

registration on the car and for a driver's license using the name
the driver had given (p. 6 ) . A check of the vehicle's license
plate, ADP307, by Kennedy with the State's Department of Motor
Vehicles computer indicated that the plate belonged on a 1972 Toyota
(p. 5 ) . The vehicle was impounded (p. 7 ) .
The unidentified driver was questioned by Kennedy about
his driver's license and automobile registration (p. 6 ) . The driver
was not a person known to Kennedy by a previous contact (p. 12).
Richards administered field sobriety tests to the driver after
Kennedy noticed the smell of alcohol on his person (p. 5 ) . The
driver was cited for the traffic offenses of improper registration
and open container (p. 8 ) . He was not arrested and was not searched
(p. 12). After the citation was issued he was allowed to leave (p.
12) .
Spidle testified that shortly after the vehicle was
stopped, the first officer on the scene, Kennedy, asked him for his
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name and said he was going to run a check on him.

Kennedy knew

Spidle from contacts spanning a number of years (p. 10). Spidle
remained in the passenger seat for the twenty minutes after the
vehicle stop and before the vehicle was impounded (p. 11). Kennedy
was alone with Spidle and the driver for the two to three minutes
before Richards first arrived and for the two to three minutes when
Richards absented himself to respond to a nearby disturbance (p. 9,
11).

Neither Kennedy nor Richards noticed any unusual movements or

behavior by Spidle as he sat in the vehicle (p. 9, 21).
Kennedy asked Richards to remove the passenger, Spidle,
from the vehicle so that it could be fully searched and impounded
(p. 7 ) . Richards testified that just prior to this request by
Kennedy he had asked Spidle for identification (p. 20). Up to that
point, nearly twenty minutes after the stop, Richards did not know
who the passenger was nor had he learned his identity from Kennedy
(p. 20, 21). Although Richards had had no prior personal contact
with Spidle, he knew of Spidlefs name from other deputies and the
station bulletin board (p. 22, 25, 26). Richards understood that
Spidle's criminal record included possession of controlled
substances and burglary (p. 25).
Richards testified that once Spidle identified himself he
was not free to leave, that he was being held or detained (p. 27).
Richards then conducted a Terry search of Spidle (p. 17). He
ordered Spidle to open his jacket (p. 23). Spidle was wearing a
long, heavy army fatigue jacket (p. 24). Richards had not detected
any unusual bulges that might have indicated a weapon was present
(p. 25). As Spidle opened his jacket an object, later identified as

- 3

-

marijuana, fell to the street (p. 26). No pat search to detect hard
objects was conducted until after the order was given to open the
jacket (p. 26).
Richards testified that the search was conducted out of
concern for his own safety, that he had decided there was a very
distinct possibility Spidle might be in possession of a firearm (p.
25).

That concern arose from his knowledge that Spidle had a

criminal record, was known to have controlled substances on his
person, and experience that people involved with narcotics or
burglaries do on occasion carry weapons (p. 24, 25, 28). Richards
knew of no occasions in which Spidle personally carried a weapon,
however, and had no knowledge Spidle was carrying narcotics on this
occasion (p. 28). Richards had not received any report of crime
that night over the radio or from informants that might have
involved Spidle (p. 26).
Richards testified that the search was conducted out of
concern for his own safety (p. 25). That concern arose from his
knowledge of Spidlefs past, although he had never met Spidle
personally, knew of no occasions in which Spidle personally carried
a weapon, and had no knowledge Spidle was carrying narcotics on this
occasion (p. 25, 22, 28). Richards had not received any report of
crime that night over the radio or from informants that might have
involved Spidle.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Richards lacked the articulable suspicion that Spidle was
engaged in criminal activity necessary to justify the detention of
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Spidle in a Terry investigative stop.

When the seizure is unlawful

the evidence resulting therefrom must be suppressed.
Richards lacked the particular facts from which he could
have reasonably inferred that Spidle was armed and dangerous
necessary to justify a Terry frisk to insure the officer's safety.
When the search is unlawful the evidence resulting therefrom must be
suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT WAS AN UNLAWFUL
SEIZURE BECAUSE THE DEPUTY LACKED A REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT HE WAS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
established a limited exception to the general requirement that
police officers obtain a warrant, based on probable cause, for all
seizures of persons.

The Court recognized that a police officer may

in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for purposes of investigating the possibility of criminal
activity even though probable cause to make an arrest does not
exist.

Id. at 22.

A brief detention without probable cause to

arrest, howevever, which results in any curtailment of that person's
liberty by the police, must be supported by a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal
activity.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of

Utah adopts language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of
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the United States Constitution.

Utah has codified the Terry

requirement that detention of a person by the police must be based
on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Section 77-7-15 Utah

Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states:
A police officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his namef address, and an explanation of his
actions.
See also State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).
In the present casef Spidle contends that Richard's
detention of him at the vehicle was an unlawful seizure under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the brief detention of a person for investigative
questioning is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Terry

establishes that for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment a person is
"seized" when an officer "accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away."

This may be accomplished by means of

physical force or show of authority.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19.

A

person's freedom to walk away must be judged objectively; a person
has been seized if "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave."

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,

554-5 (1980).
In the case at hand, Spidle was a passenger in a vehicle
involved in a traffic stop.

He remained with the driver and vehicle
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awaiting the disposition by the deputy sheriffs.

Twenty minutes

after the traffic stop Spidle was ordered out of the vehicle and
ordered to submit to a search (p. 23). Deputy Richards stated that
after Spidle identified himself he was not free to leave, that
Richards was detaining Spidle (p. 27). Spidle got out of the car
and submitted to search as Richards ordered.
In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court listed examples of
circumstances which might indicate a seizure.
were:

1)

Included in the list

the threatening presence of several officers, and 2) the

use of language indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled.

ijcL at 554.

Richard's assertion of

authority as a police officer in the presence of Deputy Kennedy, his
express statement that Spidle was being detained, coupled with
Spidlefs reasonable belief that he was not free to leave, constitute
a seizure of his person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, Section 14.
For this seizure to be lawful the officer effectuating
the detention must point to specific, articulable facts which,
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead
a reasonable person to conclude the person and committed or was
about to commit a crime.

Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States v.

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); State v. Swanigan, 669 P.2d 718 (Utah
1985), State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987).
In United States v. Hensley, supra, the United States
Supreme Court upheld an investigatory stop by police officers in
objective reliance on another police department's "wanted flyer",
where the flyer was issued on the basis of articulable facts
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supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has
committed an offense.

An officer recognized the suspect on the

street, and two other officers, acting on knowledge of the wanted
flyer, converged on the suspect.

The Court upheld the stop even

though the flyer was based on a crime two weeks earlier, stating
that a stop is proper to investigate upon reasonable suspicion
whether a crime has been committed.

Id. at 612.

In State v.

Swanigan, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held an investigatory stop
unconstitutional.

Defendant was seen walking in the area of recent

burglary, and was later stopped by police.

Defendant was not placed

at the scene of the crime nor was he observed engaged in any
unlawful or suspicious behavior.

Id. at 719.

Again in State v.

Trujillo, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals held the stop
unconstitutional, finding that the totality of the circumstances
preceding the seizure did not support a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.

The defendant was walking State Street in Salt

Lake City late at night with two companions, and appeared nervous
when stopped and questioned by police.

A search subsequent to the

stop produced a knife concealed on defendant's person.

The Court

found the balance between crime prevention and unreasonable seizures
weighed in favor of defendant's right in personal security.

Id. at

90.
in the case before the court, Appellant argues first that
the basis for articulable suspicion furnished by the wanted flyer in
Hensley is not provided by unspecified postings on the police
station bulletin board and the officer's general knowledge of
defendant's criminal record.

Deputy Richards did not state that the

station postings specified past criminal activity or an ongoing
- 8
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investigation which focused suspicion on Spidle.

No outstanding

warrants for Spidle were mentioned by either officer.

Spidle waited

quietly in the vehicle for 20 minutes after Kennedy said a warrant
check would be done (p. 35). Hensley is distinguishable from this
case because there was no specific basis for stopping Spidle for a
criminal offense that had earlier been committed.
Appellant argues that the specific facts articulated by
Richards to justify the basis for the detention are even less
substantial that those facts found to provide an unconstitutional
stop in Swanigan and Trujillo, supra.

Neither Kennedy or Richards

described the scene as a high crime area, nor stated that the time
of day contributed to their decision.

Neither deputy cited an

ongoing criminal activity in the area, such as burglary or vehicle
vandalism, that caused them to be more suspicious, and Richards, who
made the stop, specifically denied receiving any reports of criminal
activity that night over the radio or from informants that might
have involved Spidle (p. 26). The initial contact between police
and defendant was based on the traffic stop of a third person, the
vehicle's driver, in a routine traffic stop (p. 9 ) . When asked,
Spidle gave his correct name to Kennedy, who knew him already, and
then sat quietly in the vehicle for twenty minutes (p. 9 ) . Neither
Kennedy nor Richards noticed any unusual movements or behavior by
Spidle as he sat in the vehicle (p. 9, 21). In all of this, there
are no reports of a contemporaneous crime, as in the burglary in
Swanigan, nor of recent criminal activity in an arguably high crime
area, as in Trujillo.

Appellant argues that there are jio specific

facts to justify Spidle's detention, when "a determination
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of the reasonableness of the police conduct is highly factual in
nature."

Trujillo at 86.
In asserting the constitutionality of a seizure, the

rights of individuals to be free from a necessary harassment of
arbitrary interference from law officers must be weighed with the
interest of the public in being protected from crime.

Trujillo at

87 (citations omitted); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703
(1983).

Here the police-citizen contact resulted from a routine

traffic stop in which the driver was issued a citation and released,
without further detention or a search of his person.

Spidle was

detained by the backup officer for nothing more than owning a
criminal record.

The backup officer's actions, without basis in

specific facts known to him or the supervising officer, violated
defendant's right again unreasonable seizure without a
countervailing justification in the public interest.
POINT II. THE FRISK OF APPELLANT WAS AN UNLAWFUL
SEARCH BECAUSE THE DEPUTY LACKED A REASONABLE BELIEF
THAT HE WAS PRESENTLY ARMED AND DANGEROUS.
As noted previously, in Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United
States Supreme Court formulated a limited exception for
investigatory stops to the general rule, under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section XIV of the
Utah Constitution, that to seize a person police officers must have
a warrant based on probable cause to believe the individual
committed a crime.

Similarly under the Fourth Amendment and Article

I, Section XIV is the general rule "that the police may not conduct
a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there
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is probable cause to do so."
(1981).

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457

A limited exception to the warrant requirement has been

created for searches incident to an arrest.

"[A] few 'jealously and

carefully drawn1 exceptions provide for those cases where the
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law
officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh
the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.ff
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
exception:

Arkansas

Terry established a further

where probable cause to arrest is lacking, but an

investigatory stop has properly detained the individual, a police
officer may conduct a limited search for weapons upon a reasonable
belief that the person is armed and presently dangerous.
30.

Terry at

The "inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer's action was

justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.

Terry at 20-21.

Appellant first argues that he was subjected to search by
Deputy Richards.

As he exited the vehicle Richards asked Spidle to

open his coat so that a Terry search could be performed (p. 17).
Richards said he was in the process of conducting a Terry search
when he asked Spidle to open his jacket, and characterized the
request as an order (p. 22, 23). Richards said the search was
initiated out of concern for his safety (p. 25). In People v.
De Bour, 352 N.E. 2d 562, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (N.Y. 1976), the New York
Court of Appeals found a search had been conducted when an officer
requested that the person unzip his jacket.

When Spidle opened his

jacket an object, later identified as marijuana, fell to the ground
(p. 18).
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Appellant next argues that the search was not justified
at its inception.

In Terry the officer detailed facts and

circumstances that warranted a reasonably prudent person in
believing the suspicious individual to be armed and a threat to the
officer's safety.

Id. at 28.

Two men hovered at a street corner

for an extended period of time, alternately walking by a store
window a dozen times and then conferring briefly.

The officer's

experience led him to infer a burglary or stick-up from these
facts.

Since the suspected crime involved weapons, the officer

conducted a pat-down of the outer clothing after he stopped the
individuals.

Id. at 6-7.

The Court upheld the search.

In Sibron

v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Supreme Court found the search
to be unreasonable, saying that the officer "must be able to point
to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the
individual was armed and dangerous."

Sibron at 64.

The officer

watched the suspect over an eight-hour period talk with a number of
known narcotics addicts.

The officer reached into defendant's

pocket and brought out narcotics, the same pocket defendant explored
as the officer stopped him.

The officer did not mention the

possible possession of a weapon to justify the search.
Appellant argues Sibron is controlling.

Id. at 64.

Richards had a

general, second-hand knowledge of Spidle and an unconfirmed belief
in a drug and burglary background (p. 25). He understood that
Spidle was known to have controlled substances on his person (p.
24).

Richards, however, knew of no occasion on which Spidle carried

a firearm (p. 28). Richards did not state that he suspected Spidle
of burglary or a drug transaction that evening, which could lead to
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the inference that Spidle was armed.

Spidle was not in a location

or circumstance, and did not exhibit suspicious behavior, similar to
the defendants in Terry.

But like the individual in Sibron, Spidle

was suspected of carrying narcotics on his person.

Richards

searched for drugs, found drugs, and rationalized the search for
weapons after the fact.

Under Sibron the search of Spidle by

Richards was unlawful because there was no reasonable basis in
particular facts to suggest Spidle was armed and presently dangerous.
Lastly, under Terry, supra, appellant argues that the
search was overly intrusive and not reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.

Terry at 20.
In People v. DeBour, supra, the New York Court of Appeals

found that the officer's command to the individual to unzip his
jacket was a minimal intrusion and justified by the observation of
the officer of a bulge at the waistband which he took to be a gun.
De Bour, 352 N.E. 2d at 570.

Richards did not testified that he saw

a bulge that might have indicated presence of a gun, but that the
jacket was so heavy and large that nothing could be detected on just
plain view (p. 26). Richards did not first conduct a pat-search.
Appellant argues that in the absence on any outward manifestation of
a weapon even the minimally intrusive request to open ones jacket is
precluded. .

CONCLUSION
Standing to challenge the seizure and subsequent search
of Spidle is governed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
- 13 -

Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968), State v.

Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).

The burden of proof is on the

party seeking an exemption from the general requirement that a
warrant be obtained prior to a seizure or search.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969).

See Chimel v.

The State has failed to

provide a basis for such an exemption in the stop and frisk of
Spidle.
First, the State failed to show that Spidle was lawfully
detained upon the articulable suspicion that he was engaged in
criminal activity.

Second, the State has failed to show that Spidle

was lawfully searched pursuant to a reasonable belief that he was
armed and presently dangerous. For these reasons, Appellant
requests that the evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful
seizure and subsequent unlawful search be suppressed.

Appellant

further request that this case be remanded for appropriate
disposition.
DATED this /(?Thh day of November, 1987.

CH^LE S < j^TH^^/
AttorneyTSTAppellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, CHARLES F. LOYD, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and four
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copies to the Attorney General's office, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this

/^/7^ day of November, 1987.

DELIVERED by

this

November, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
Acting County Attorney
HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
Screened by-;—H R Lemcke
Assigned t o : H R Lemcke

THE"STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

BAIL

$5,000.00

v.
INFORMATION
RANDY S. SPIDLE

DOB 01/03/62,
Criminal No.

Defendant(si-

Ihe. undersigned Kendra L. Herlin - SLCSO under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes
of:
COUNT I
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION"OF-A-€ONTR<>tLED SUBSTANCE, a Class A Misdemeanor,
at 930. East Galena, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
or about December 12, 1986, in violation of Title 58,
Chapter~3"T;—Section -$7—Utah- Code—Annotated 4-^53-jr— as amended,
in that the defendant, RANDY S. SPIDLE, a party to the
offense, did knowingly and intentionally have in his
possession a controlled substance, to-wit: more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces of Marijuana, a Schedule I
Controlled Substance;
THIS INFORMATION IS_BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Rex Kennedy

Mike Richards

(Continued on page Two)

Kendra Herlin

State Crime Lab.

INFORMATION
STATE v. RANDY S. SPIDLE
County Attorney #86-1-71477
Page Two
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases the above upon the following:
1.
The statement of Deputy Kennedy that on December 12,
1986, he pulled over a white Rambler for having a fraudulent
registration, at 930 East Galena, Sandy. The driver, one Stacy E.
Brown, had been drinking and there was an open container in the
vehicle.
Mr. Brown and the vehicle's passenger, the defendant,
here, Randy Steven Spidle were asked out of the vehicle.
2.
The statement of Deputy Richards, who was also at the
scene, that he was made aware that Mr. Spidle was a known burglar.
When the deputy started a Terry frisk of Mr. Spidle, he opened the
defendants
coat
and
saw
approximately
one-quarter
pound
of
marijuana fall out of that coat onto the ground.
3.
Your affiant's observation that the substance weigh1s
approximately 4 ounces and field tested positive for cannabis.
4. The statement of the defendant, after Miranda, to your
affiant that "you've just got me on simple possession. You've got
to show me with baggies or other packaging to get a felony." "I
paid two and a quarter ($225.00) for this.'1

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this
day of December, 1986.

Judge
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filing:
DAVID E. YPCOM, Acting County Attorney
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